Iran Likely To Reverse Engineer Captured U.S. Underwater Drone

Iran Captures U.S. Dive-LD Underwater Drone Near Strait of Hormuz

Iran’s capture of a U.S. Dive-LD autonomous underwater vehicle near the Strait of Hormuz has created a potential reverse-engineering opportunity for Tehran, although U.S. officials say the older vehicle did not carry classified sonar or radar equipment. The incident was reported after Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps said it had seized the unmanned submersible, while the Pentagon said the vehicle had malfunctioned during an operation in regional waters.

The incident illustrates a growing challenge for the U.S. Navy as autonomous underwater vehicles move from experimentation toward operational use. Unlike conventional ships and submarines, relatively small unmanned systems can be deployed in greater numbers, but their loss or disablement can also create opportunities for adversaries to examine the technology.

Iranian officials have presented the capture as evidence of a U.S. technological setback. The available evidence, however, does not establish that Tehran obtained sensitive mission data or classified equipment from the vehicle. The Pentagon’s characterization is that the system was an older model without sensitive data collection equipment.

What Is the Anduril Dive-LD?

The captured platform has been identified as the Dive-LD, a large-diameter autonomous underwater vehicle developed by California-based defense company Anduril Industries.

Anduril lists the Dive-LD at approximately 5.8 meters (19 feet) long and about 1.2 meters (4 feet) in diameter. The company advertises a maximum endurance of approximately 10 days and a maximum operating depth of 6,000 meters.

The platform is designed around modular payload integration rather than a single mission. Anduril lists intelligence preparation of the operational environment, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, mine warfare and precision placement among potential defense missions.

That flexibility is important because the strategic value of an autonomous underwater vehicle is not determined solely by its hull. The payload, navigation system, communications architecture, autonomy software and mission-management system can determine what the vehicle can actually accomplish.

Why Reverse Engineering Matters

The immediate concern is not necessarily that Iran can copy the Dive-LD and produce an equivalent vehicle.

Reverse engineering an advanced autonomous underwater system is a much more complicated process than simply reproducing its external shape. Underwater vehicles must manage navigation, propulsion, energy consumption, depth control, acoustic signatures, sensor integration and autonomous mission execution in an environment where satellite navigation is unavailable below the surface.

A captured vehicle can nevertheless provide useful engineering information.

Iranian engineers could potentially examine accessible elements such as the vehicle’s mechanical arrangement, pressure-resistant structures, propulsion system, power-management architecture, payload mounting arrangements and manufacturing methods. The extent of what can be learned would depend heavily on the condition of the recovered vehicle and the protection applied to its software and electronics.

Defense analysts cited by Defense News said Iran could gain more from studying the physical system than from obtaining a complete copy of its operational capabilities.

That distinction matters.

An adversary may be able to reproduce selected mechanical features without being able to reproduce the software, sensors, manufacturing tolerances, materials, algorithms or broader U.S. operational architecture that make the original system effective.

U.S. Officials Downplay Sensitive Technology Loss

The Pentagon has sought to limit the significance of the capture.

According to the U.S. statement reported by Reuters and Defense News, the vehicle had malfunctioned more than a day before it was recovered by Iranian forces. U.S. officials described it as an older model and said it did not collect sensitive data or carry classified sonar or radar equipment.

This distinction is important for assessing the incident.

A disabled unmanned vehicle does not necessarily represent the compromise of an operational network. If sensitive mission data was not stored aboard the vehicle and critical sensors or classified payloads were absent, the intelligence value of the capture could be substantially lower than the physical appearance of the platform suggests.

At the same time, the loss demonstrates a different type of risk. Autonomous systems are often designed to be expendable relative to crewed platforms, but their hardware can still have value if an adversary gains physical access.

Dive-LD Is Part of a Larger U.S. Undersea Strategy

The incident comes as the U.S. Navy and defense industry place greater emphasis on autonomous systems that can expand maritime surveillance without requiring a crewed vessel for every mission.

In 2024, Anduril announced that the Defense Innovation Unit had selected the company and its Dive family of large autonomous underwater vehicles for prototyping distributed, long-range and persistent underwater sensing and payload delivery in contested environments.

The company has also invested in large-scale production. Anduril announced plans for a Rhode Island manufacturing facility intended to support production of as many as 200 autonomous underwater vehicles per year, reflecting the broader U.S. effort to move undersea autonomy toward greater scale.

This is strategically significant.

Traditional submarines provide sophisticated capabilities but are expensive, crew-intensive and limited in number. Large autonomous underwater vehicles offer a different model. They can potentially distribute sensors across wider areas, conduct persistent missions and reduce the need to expose crewed platforms to certain risks.

That advantage depends on scale and survivability.

If an autonomous vehicle is lost, the U.S. concept of operations must assume that some systems will eventually be captured, damaged or disabled. The key question is therefore not whether every vehicle can be protected indefinitely, but whether the fleet can maintain useful capability despite individual losses.

Iran Has Previous Experience With Captured U.S. Unmanned Systems

The Dive-LD incident also fits a longer pattern involving Iranian attempts to seize or exploit U.S. unmanned technology.

In 2011, Iran captured an American RQ-170 Sentinel reconnaissance aircraft. Tehran later claimed it had reverse-engineered the aircraft and displayed aircraft it said were based on the captured design. The extent of the resulting Iranian technical capability remains difficult to independently establish, but the episode demonstrated the propaganda and intelligence value Tehran assigns to captured U.S. systems.

Iran has also attempted to take U.S. maritime unmanned systems.

In August 2022, U.S. Navy forces intervened after an Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy support vessel attempted to tow away a U.S. Saildrone Explorer unmanned surface vessel in the Arabian Gulf. The Navy said the Saildrone carried commercially available sensors, radars and cameras and did not store sensitive or classified information.

Days later, an Iranian warship seized two similar U.S. unmanned surface vessels in the Red Sea before they were returned following a U.S. naval response.

The pattern suggests that Iran understands the value of gaining physical access to unmanned systems even when the systems themselves are not classified.

The Strait of Hormuz Adds Operational Significance

The location of the incident is also important.

The Strait of Hormuz is one of the world’s most strategically important maritime chokepoints. Underwater surveillance in and around the waterway can support missions involving maritime traffic monitoring, seabed mapping, mine warfare, infrastructure inspection and broader intelligence collection.

Anduril specifically identifies mine warfare, intelligence preparation of the operational environment and ISR among Dive-LD’s potential missions.

This makes autonomous underwater systems particularly relevant to the Gulf environment. They can potentially remain underwater for extended periods while reducing the need to expose a crewed ship or aircraft to every surveillance task.

The same geography, however, creates a recovery problem.

A vehicle operating in contested or closely monitored waters can become vulnerable if it suffers a propulsion, power, navigation or communications failure. Once a disabled platform is located, the adversary may have an opportunity to reach it before U.S. forces can recover it.

The Bigger Issue Is Protecting Unmanned Systems From Capture

The most important lesson from the Dive-LD incident may therefore extend beyond Iran’s ability to copy individual components.

As the U.S. Navy fields more autonomous systems, security planning must account for the possibility that unmanned platforms will be physically recovered by an adversary.

That can influence several areas of system design:

• Data protection: Mission data should be minimized, encrypted and protected against unauthorized recovery.
• Software security: Autonomous systems need safeguards against unauthorized access to mission software and control architectures.
• Payload separation: Sensitive mission equipment can potentially be separated from less sensitive vehicle components.
• Recovery planning: Operations should account for how a disabled vehicle will be located and recovered.
• Fleet resilience: The loss of one vehicle should not compromise an entire unmanned network.
• Manufacturing scale: Systems designed for mass production can make individual losses less strategically damaging.

These considerations are increasingly important as autonomous systems become more central to U.S. naval operations.

The U.S. Navy has already demonstrated the value it places on unmanned maritime systems in the Middle East. Naval Forces Central Command established Task Force 59 in 2021 to integrate unmanned systems and artificial intelligence into Fifth Fleet operations, including work with industry and international partners.

What Iran Can and Cannot Learn From the Capture

The available evidence supports a measured assessment.

Iran is likely to have an opportunity to examine the vehicle’s physical construction if it has recovered the platform intact. That could provide information about design choices, components and engineering approaches.

It does not follow that Iran can reproduce the complete Dive-LD capability.

Autonomous underwater warfare depends on a wider technology base. Sensors, navigation algorithms, acoustic processing, batteries, propulsion, communications, mission software, manufacturing quality and operational experience all contribute to performance.

The loss of an older vehicle without classified sonar or radar equipment also limits the potential intelligence impact described publicly by U.S. officials.

The episode is therefore better understood as a technology exposure and operational security problem, rather than evidence that Iran has suddenly acquired an equivalent U.S. undersea warfare capability.

Strategic Implications for the U.S. Navy

For Washington, the incident highlights the tradeoff inherent in distributed autonomous warfare.

The U.S. is pursuing larger numbers of relatively affordable unmanned systems because autonomous platforms can extend sensing and operational reach while reducing risks to sailors. Anduril’s production plans for the Dive family reflect that push toward scale.

But scale also changes how technology security must be approached.

A future fleet could contain hundreds or thousands of autonomous platforms. In that environment, it may be unrealistic to assume every vehicle will remain under U.S. control throughout its operational life.

The stronger approach is to design the force so that the capture of an individual platform produces limited intelligence value and does not expose sensitive networks or operational plans.

That principle is especially relevant in the Indo-Pacific and Middle East, where autonomous systems could operate close to adversary coastlines, maritime chokepoints and contested infrastructure.

Bottom Line

Iran’s capture of a U.S. Dive-LD underwater drone is a setback for the U.S. military and Anduril, but the publicly available evidence does not show that Tehran obtained classified sonar, radar or sensitive mission data.

The more immediate concern is the physical intelligence that Iran can potentially extract from an intact autonomous underwater vehicle. The episode demonstrates that as the U.S. Navy moves toward larger fleets of autonomous maritime systems, protecting the technology after a malfunction or loss will become almost as important as developing the vehicles themselves.

For Iran, the capture provides a propaganda opportunity and potentially useful engineering information. For the United States, it reinforces a central requirement of future unmanned warfare: autonomous systems must be designed not only to operate independently, but also to remain resilient when damaged, lost or recovered by an adversary.