| Name / Designation | DF-ZF (formerly WU-14) |
| Type | Hypersonic Glide Vehicle (HGV) |
| Manufacturer | China Aerospace Science Industry Corporation (CASIC), 10th Research Institute |
| Country of Origin | China |
| Role / Purpose | High-speed, maneuverable strike with conventional or nuclear payload |
| Operational Status | Operational (since ≈2020) |
| Length | Not publicly disclosed |
| Body Design | Lifting-body glider with control fins for aerodynamic maneuvering |
| Material | High-temperature composites with thermal protection |
| Launch Platform | DF-17 solid-fueled mobile ballistic missile booster |
| Payload Capacity | Compatible with conventional or nuclear warhead (weight not disclosed) |
| Propulsion Type | None during glide; powered by DF-17 booster until release |
| Speed | Mach 5–10 (~1.7–3.4 km/s) |
| Range | ~1,800–2,500 km (booster-dependent) |
| Maneuverability | High; evasive glide maneuvers during flight |
| Flight Profile | Boost-glide: ascent to near-space, separation, unpowered hypersonic glide |
| Guidance System | Inertial navigation system, possibly augmented by terminal sensors |
| Terminal Guidance | Likely inertial + sensors (details classified) |
| Accuracy (CEP) | Not publicly confirmed; reported “within meters” in tests |
| Counter-Jamming | Hardened against basic electronic countermeasures |
| Warhead Type | Conventional or nuclear |
| Explosive Yield | Not publicly disclosed; depends on payload |
| Penetration Ability | Designed to defeat advanced missile-defense systems via high speed & maneuverable glide |
| Thermal Protection | Advanced high-temperature composites for re-entry heat resistance |
| Stealth Features | Low-altitude, non-ballistic glide reduces radar/infrared detection |
| Anti-Interception Ability | Unpredictable glide path + hypersonic speed limits effectiveness of current ABM systems |
The DF‑ZF represents a significant leap in modern strike capabilities — a hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV) engineered to outpace and outmaneuver existing missile defenses. Built by China’s China Aerospace Science Industry Corporation (CASIC) in cooperation with its 10th Research Institute, DF‑ZF (formerly designated “WU‑14”) entered operational status around 2019–2020, integrated primarily with the road‑mobile DF‑17 medium-range ballistic missile.
Upon launch, the DF‑17’s solid‑fuel booster carries DF‑ZF to near‑space altitudes — roughly 100 km — before release. At that point, the DF‑ZF shifts to a boost‑glide profile: using aerodynamic lift rather than powered thrust, it glides toward its target at sustained hypersonic velocities, reportedly between Mach 5 and Mach 10.
This combination of extreme speed and maneuverable glide drastically complicates tracking and interception. Traditional ballistic missiles follow predictable arcs; the DF‑ZF instead performs evasive flight, weaving laterally or changing altitude, limiting reaction windows for missile defense systems.
Intended for both conventional and nuclear payloads, DF‑ZF enhances strategic flexibility. Its estimated range — when paired with DF‑17 — lies between 1,800 and 2,500 km, enabling strikes across a broad regional footprint.
As such, DF‑ZF stands as one of the world’s first operational hypersonic glide vehicles, designed not simply for speed but for survivable penetration of modern layered air‑ and missile‑defenses. Its existence shifts the calculus for any adversary relying on legacy interceptor systems.
Due to the classified nature of DF‑ZF, no public data is available regarding acquisition cost. Officially only limited production and deployment numbers are acknowledged by the manufacturer and relevant Chinese authorities; thus a validated “price in the United States” cannot be provided.
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