Executive Summary
- Secretary of War Pete Hegseth has directed the creation of the Autonomous Warfare Command, a proposed four-star functional combatant command intended to scale autonomous and robotic capabilities across the Joint Force.
- Project Agincourt will serve as the interim pathway. The Direct Reporting Portfolio Manager for Unmanned Systems, or DRPM-UxS, will lead the effort, with DIU Director Owen West and Navy SEAL Senior Chief Max Strasiser assigned as its CEO and COO. [Department of War, Project Agincourt memorandum]
- The proposed command is targeted for establishment by October 1, 2027, but the Pentagon’s own planning documents indicate that congressional action is required. The initiative therefore represents an organizational and acquisition reform effort that has not yet reached its final command structure.
Secretary of War Pete Hegseth has ordered the Department of War to begin building a new Autonomous Warfare Command, a four-star functional combatant command intended to accelerate the development, procurement, testing and fielding of autonomous and robotic systems across the U.S. Joint Force.
Hegseth announced the initiative during his September 30 State of the Force address at Marine Corps Base Quantico, Virginia. The Pentagon intends to use Project Agincourt as the interim mechanism for preparing the new command, with October 1, 2027 identified as the target date for establishing the command. [Department of War, September 30, 2026]
The significance is less about creating another headquarters than about changing where requirements, acquisition decisions and operational feedback are generated. The Pentagon is attempting to reduce the distance between troops employing unmanned systems, engineers developing them and companies producing them.
Project Agincourt Is the Bridge to the New Command
The Project Agincourt memorandum directs the Direct Reporting Portfolio Manager for Unmanned Systems to establish the pathway toward the Autonomous Warfare Command.
The proposed command would define joint autonomous warfare requirements and integrate service-provided forces in support of geographic combatant commanders. It would also test equipment and force designs under demanding conditions, rapidly modify systems and field capabilities that demonstrate operational value. [Project Agincourt memorandum]
That approach represents a significant change from a traditional acquisition sequence in which requirements, development, testing and procurement are separated across large organizations and long program cycles.
Project Agincourt instead emphasizes repeated operational feedback. The stated objective is not simply to procure a particular drone, but to establish a repeatable process capable of adapting autonomous systems as battlefield requirements change.
The memorandum directs DRPM-UxS to submit a plan of action and milestones within 30 days, with support from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Joint Staff is also expected to designate a senior planning counterpart.
West and Strasiser Take Different Roles
Hegseth appointed Owen West and Navy SEAL Senior Chief Max Strasiser to lead DRPM-UxS during the transition.
West, who currently directs the Defense Innovation Unit, brings responsibility for strategic risk, resources and scale. Strasiser is assigned the operational side of the effort, including problem-solving and the realities of employing unmanned systems in combat. [Department of War; Defense Innovation Unit]
The pairing reflects the Pentagon’s stated objective of connecting commercial technology development with military operational requirements.
West previously served as the Department’s senior advisor for the Drone Dominance effort before becoming DIU director. DIU has also expanded its autonomy portfolio and continues to work with commercial companies on rapid technology adoption. [DIU]
From Drone Programs to a Joint Command
The proposed command does not emerge from a standing start.
In July, the Department of War consolidated unmanned and autonomous systems under the DRPM-UxS position, reporting directly to the Deputy Secretary of War. The department said the move was intended to accelerate development, procurement and fielding of autonomous capabilities at scale. [Department of War, July 1, 2026]
That organizational change created an initial department-wide structure for UxS activity. Project Agincourt now provides a pathway toward a permanent combatant command.
The Pentagon is also using Joint Interagency Task Force 401 as an example of accelerated acquisition and operational integration. JIATF 401 has been responsible for rapidly fielding counter-UAS capabilities and has established common testing and evaluation approaches for emerging systems. [Department of War, April-May 2026]
The result is an emerging architecture with several layers:
| Organization or initiative | Primary role | Relationship to autonomy |
|---|---|---|
| DRPM-UxS | Department-wide unmanned systems management | Current organizational foundation |
| Project Agincourt | Transition and experimentation effort | Pathway to Autonomous Warfare Command |
| Autonomous Warfare Command | Proposed four-star combatant command | Joint operational and capability integration |
| JIATF 401 | Counter-UAS integration and fielding | Rapid operational application |
| Defense Innovation Unit | Commercial technology transition | Industry and technology pipeline |
The central question will be whether these organizations eventually complement one another or create overlapping authorities.
The Real Change Is Acquisition, Not Just Organization
The most consequential element of Project Agincourt may be its proposed acquisition model.
Traditional major defense programs are generally optimized around relatively stable requirements and large platforms with long development cycles. Autonomous systems are different. Software, sensors, communications equipment, autonomy algorithms and airframes can change much faster than traditional acquisition timelines.
A command designed around autonomy therefore needs a different feedback loop.
The Pentagon’s approach is to put operators closer to developers, conduct repeated testing and move procurement decisions closer to operational users. That could allow units to identify failures earlier and give industry more direct information about what is actually required.
It also creates a difficult management problem.
A system that performs well in one exercise may not remain effective after an adversary changes its electronic warfare, air defense, communications or deception techniques. The value of an autonomous warfare organization will therefore depend heavily on how quickly it can replace, modify or reconfigure systems.
The Pentagon’s own Project Agincourt language emphasizes adaptation as an output of the acquisition system.
That is an important distinction. The objective is not simply a larger inventory of drones. It is a military process capable of continuously changing the inventory.
Autonomous Warfare Will Span Multiple Domains
The proposed command is not limited to small aerial drones.
The military services are already developing autonomous capabilities across several mission areas. The Air Force and Navy are pursuing Collaborative Combat Aircraft, while the Navy is developing the MQ-25 unmanned aerial refueling system. The Air Force is also examining lower-cost autonomous aircraft for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance missions. [Air & Space Forces Association]
At sea, unmanned surface vessels are already being used for operational missions, including maritime surveillance in the Middle East. On land, autonomous ground vehicles and robotic systems are being evaluated for logistics, reconnaissance and other missions.
This creates a force-design problem that individual services may struggle to solve independently.
An autonomous aircraft may need to exchange data with crewed aircraft, surface forces, satellites, command networks and electronic warfare systems. A ground robot may need to operate under communications degradation while still sharing information with human units.
The proposed combatant command could provide a mechanism for developing those cross-domain requirements.
The High-Low Force Mix Is Driving the Strategy
Hegseth’s announcement also fits into a broader Pentagon debate over the balance between sophisticated high-end weapons and large numbers of lower-cost autonomous systems.
The United States continues to invest heavily in complex platforms such as advanced fighters, bombers, submarines, air-defense systems and long-range precision weapons. Autonomous systems offer another layer of force structure, particularly where attritable or expendable platforms can provide additional sensing, communications, electronic warfare or strike capacity.
This does not mean autonomous systems replace high-end platforms.
Instead, the emerging model is a layered force in which expensive systems provide capabilities that smaller systems cannot, while autonomous platforms increase mass, persistence and operational coverage.
The practical value depends on the cost and speed of replacement, not simply the unit price of an individual drone.
A low-cost autonomous system that requires extensive support personnel, specialized communications infrastructure and long logistics chains may not produce the expected operational advantage. Conversely, a system designed for rapid production and replacement could change how commanders calculate risk.
Russia’s Experience Highlights the Organizational Challenge
The Pentagon has already pointed to Russia’s experience with autonomous warfare as an organizational lesson.
During March testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Maj. Gen. Steven Marks, then director of the Defense Autonomous Warfare Group, highlighted Russia’s Rubicon organization as an example of an adversary developing dedicated structures around unmanned warfare.
Marks argued that the lesson extends beyond individual drone designs. The organizational model can influence how quickly systems are acquired, tested, adapted and employed. [Senate Armed Services Committee, March 2026]
That observation is directly relevant to Project Agincourt.
The competition is not simply between U.S. and foreign drone designs. It is also between different military systems for turning battlefield observations into new equipment and tactics.
Ukraine has demonstrated the speed at which commercial components, software and tactical experimentation can alter unmanned warfare. Russia has also established dedicated organizations focused on integrating drones into operational formations.
For Washington, the challenge is institutionalizing similar adaptation without sacrificing testing standards, safety, interoperability and command accountability.
Congress Is a Critical Gate
The October 1, 2027 target should not be interpreted as a guaranteed activation date.
The Project Agincourt memorandum calls for the Department to work with Congress on the establishment of the command. That requirement matters because creating a new four-star combatant command with service-like authorities involves statutory and budgetary questions.
The Senate Armed Services Committee’s FY2027 National Defense Authorization Act executive summary already included language permitting establishment of a Robotic and Autonomous Systems Combatant Command. The Senate committee also authorized more than $1 billion in additional funding for maritime unmanned systems. [Senate Armed Services Committee, FY2027 NDAA]
However, congressional authorization is not the same as final establishment.
The Pentagon must still determine the command’s precise authorities, manpower requirements, budget structure, relationship with the military departments and relationship with existing combatant commands.
Those details remain among the most important unanswered questions.
The Command’s Authorities Will Determine Its Impact
Hegseth has described the future organization as having service-like authorities, but the exact authorities have not yet been publicly defined.
That distinction is crucial.
If the command primarily establishes requirements and coordinates existing service programs, its influence could remain limited by the traditional military department acquisition structure.
If Congress and the administration provide meaningful control over manpower, procurement, testing, experimentation and funding, the command could become a much more consequential institution.
The Pentagon will also have to determine how autonomous systems are assigned to geographic combatant commands.
A Pacific-focused mission could require different systems from a European land campaign or a maritime security operation in the Middle East. A centralized command could establish common architectures and standards while allowing geographic commanders to receive forces tailored to their missions.
That balance between centralization and operational flexibility will be one of the defining design questions for the organization.
What Happens Next
The immediate milestone is the Project Agincourt plan of action and milestones, which the memorandum directs DRPM-UxS to submit within 30 days.
The next phase should clarify several issues:
- The proposed command’s statutory authorities and congressional requirements.
- The manpower and force structure needed for a four-star organization.
- The division of responsibilities between the command and the military services.
- The acquisition authorities that will be transferred or delegated.
- The testing and evaluation framework for autonomous systems.
- The command’s relationship with existing organizations such as JIATF 401 and DIU.
- The budget required to move from experimentation to sustained production.
The Department has not publicly disclosed a final manpower figure, dedicated command budget or complete force structure for the proposed Autonomous Warfare Command.
Those details should be treated as unresolved rather than inferred from the announcement.
Strategic Outlook
The proposed Autonomous Warfare Command represents an attempt to institutionalize a capability area that has moved rapidly from experimentation into operational use.
Its success will depend less on the creation of a new headquarters than on whether the Pentagon can create a faster cycle linking operational demand, engineering, testing, procurement and production.
That is particularly important because autonomy is not a single weapon category. It encompasses aircraft, maritime systems, ground robots, sensors, software, communications, command-and-control architecture and the processes used to integrate those systems with human forces.
The Pentagon has already created several pieces of that ecosystem. Project Agincourt is intended to connect them and prepare the way for a dedicated combatant command.
The October 1, 2027 target therefore marks a planning objective, not the completion of the transformation.
The more consequential test will be whether the new organization can repeatedly turn battlefield lessons into fielded capability faster than the operational environment changes.
