Saudi Arabia Weighs Offensive to Retake Bab el-Mandeb
Saudi Arabia is preparing options for a new military offensive against the Houthis in Yemen as Riyadh seeks to reverse recent Houthi advances along the country’s Red Sea coast and restore access around the Bab el-Mandeb Strait.
The operation has not been formally announced, and its timing remains uncertain. Reporting by Reuters indicates that Saudi planners are considering at least two broad approaches: a focused coastal operation around Bab el-Mandeb or a larger campaign involving several fronts inside Yemen.
The reported planning comes after a sharp deterioration in the security situation along Yemen’s western coast. The Houthis have expanded their position toward the southern Red Sea, while attacks involving missiles and drones have increased pressure on Saudi territory and critical infrastructure.
Bab el-Mandeb has become the immediate military objective
Bab el-Mandeb is the narrow maritime passage connecting the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden. Its position makes it an important route for commercial shipping moving between the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean.
For Riyadh, the issue is no longer limited to the wider Yemeni civil war. Control of territory near the strait gives the Houthis leverage over one of the region’s most important maritime corridors.
Reuters reported that Saudi Arabia has concluded that renewed peace negotiations with the Houthis would be difficult while the group retains control around Bab el-Mandeb. The same reporting said the Saudi objective is to reverse Houthi territorial gains and restore conditions that would allow maritime traffic to operate more normally.
The available reporting does not establish that Saudi Arabia has selected a final operational plan.
One option under consideration would concentrate military activity along the Red Sea coast. A second would involve simultaneous operations on several fronts, including areas in Al-Bayda, Marib, Taiz and Al-Jawf.
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Yemeni forces would carry the main ground burden
The reported Saudi approach would rely heavily on Yemeni forces operating under Riyadh’s oversight rather than a large Saudi ground intervention.
That distinction matters because the anti-Houthi camp remains divided among multiple military and political factions. These groups have received varying degrees of support from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates during the Yemen conflict, but their interests have not always aligned.
A large ground campaign would therefore depend not only on Saudi airpower and intelligence support but also on whether the Yemeni forces involved can operate under a coherent command structure.
Reuters reported that more than 100,000 Yemeni troops could potentially be mobilized depending on the scale of the operation. That figure is an estimate from officials familiar with the planning rather than a confirmed deployment order.
The same reporting cited Yemen analyst Mohammed Albasha, who said anti-Houthi forces face organizational and readiness problems that could complicate a sustained offensive.
This creates an important distinction between assembling a large force and generating an effective offensive capability. Manpower alone does not resolve command, logistics, coordination, intelligence, artillery, air support or sustainment requirements.
Saudi airpower and U.S. intelligence support
Saudi airpower is expected to provide the main external combat support for Yemeni ground forces if an offensive proceeds.
Reuters reported that Washington is already providing intelligence and targeting support for Saudi operations in Yemen. However, direct U.S. combat participation has not been reported as part of the current plan.
That limitation is significant. A Saudi-led operation would have to balance the need for persistent intelligence and targeting support against the risk of widening U.S. involvement in another regional conflict.
The reported support network also extends beyond the United States.
Pakistan and Turkey have supplied military equipment that Saudi Arabia is using in Yemen, according to Pakistani and regional officials cited by Reuters. Pakistan reportedly sent four cargo aircraft to Aden in September carrying air defense systems, light artillery, drones and counter-drone equipment.
Pakistani military advisers are also reportedly supporting Saudi counterparts, while Turkish drones previously acquired by Saudi Arabia have been used over Yemen.
These activities do not amount to confirmation that Pakistan or Turkey will participate in offensive combat operations. Reuters reported that Saudi allies are not expected to take a direct combat role.
France has also announced plans to provide defensive systems and troops to help protect the Saudi Red Sea port of Yanbu.
The defensive problem could shape the offensive
For Riyadh, a new campaign in Yemen would create a second military problem alongside the ground offensive: protecting Saudi infrastructure from retaliation.
The Houthis have demonstrated the ability to use missiles and drones against targets inside Saudi Arabia. Regional officials told Reuters that protecting oil facilities and other infrastructure is one of Riyadh’s major concerns as it considers a new operation.
That means the military requirement is not simply to support Yemeni forces advancing toward Bab el-Mandeb. Saudi Arabia would also need to maintain air and missile defenses around critical sites while sustaining offensive operations.
This creates a potentially demanding force-allocation problem. Air defense assets, surveillance systems and interceptor stocks assigned to protect population centers, energy infrastructure and ports cannot be assumed to be available simultaneously for offensive missions.
The reported involvement of Pakistan and France in defensive support illustrates the wider regional dimension of the problem.
Red Sea security is only part of the calculation
The renewed fighting is already producing consequences inside Yemen.
UNHCR reported in September that more than 100,000 people had been displaced by intensified fighting along Yemen’s western coast, with additional refugees crossing the Bab el-Mandeb Strait toward Djibouti. A later UNHCR assessment estimated that about 128,000 people had been newly displaced since the escalation began in September.
The humanitarian situation has continued to deteriorate. The World Food Programme said on October 2 that more than 149,000 people had been displaced by renewed fighting and reported that 74 percent of households surveyed in accessible areas were unable to meet their basic food needs.
WFP also said 18.3 million people across Yemen were facing acute food insecurity and requested $109 million for emergency food and nutrition assistance for up to 1.5 million people affected by the escalation.
Any expansion of fighting around the western coast would therefore have implications beyond the military contest for territory. Disruption to ports, roads and humanitarian access could further complicate food distribution and civilian movement.
Timing remains unresolved
There is no publicly confirmed launch date for the reported Saudi operation.
The officials cited by Reuters gave estimates ranging from as soon as a week to a period after the U.S. midterm elections in early November. Those differing estimates underline that the reported plans remain under consideration rather than representing a finalized operational timeline.
The choice between a limited coastal operation and a broader offensive would also carry different military requirements.
A coastal campaign could concentrate forces and objectives around the maritime corridor, while a multi-front offensive would require greater coordination across Yemen’s fragmented battle lines and would expose more Saudi-backed forces to sustained combat.
The condition of the Yemeni forces assigned to the operation will therefore be a central factor. Saudi airpower can provide significant support, but it cannot by itself substitute for effective ground forces capable of holding territory after an advance.
For now, the clearest development is that Riyadh is preparing military options after the Houthis’ advance toward Bab el-Mandeb. Whether those preparations become a limited coastal operation or a broader campaign remains unresolved, and no official announcement has established the final scope, force composition or start date.
