A draft Pentagon report says China has likely deployed more than 100 intercontinental ballistic missiles across newly built silo fields near its border with Mongolia, marking a significant milestone in Beijing’s strategic nuclear expansion and complicating global arms control efforts. The report, seen by Reuters and dated December 22, 2025, underscores how rapidly China is fielding long-range capabilities while showing limited interest in nuclear arms control negotiations.
Background
China’s nuclear arsenal has been growing steadily over the past decade, but the recent assessment suggests the buildup may be accelerating. Solid-fuel DF-31 intercontinental ballistic missiles now likely occupy more than 100 silo positions in three separate fields, a report first disclosed by Reuters indicates. These deployments could contribute to China’s broader effort to diversify and harden its strategic deterrent alongside road-mobile and sea-based systems.
Western defense analysts have warned for years that Beijing is expanding its strategic forces faster than previously anticipated, building hundreds of missile silos and preparing new delivery platforms. Estimates of China’s total nuclear warhead stockpile are in the low 600s as of 2024, but projections suggest it could surpass 1,000 by 2030. This growth comes as traditional arms control frameworks such as the New START treaty between the United States and Russia near expiration, raising concerns about a more complex strategic balance.
Details of the Report
The draft Pentagon report focuses on three newly constructed silo fields in northern China, near the Mongolian border, and indicates solid-fuel DF-31 ICBMs have likely been placed in these silos. Solid-fuel missiles like the DF-31 offer greater readiness and shorter launch preparation times compared with older liquid-fuel designs, improving China’s strategic responsiveness.
Although the Pentagon had previously identified the existence of these silo fields, this is the first assessment suggesting how many missiles they now contain. The report notes the deployment figures could change before the document is formally submitted to the U.S. Congress.
The U.S. defense department also concluded that China currently shows no appetite for engaging in binding arms control discussions, despite ongoing dialogue in Washington about potential trilateral nuclear risk reduction with the United States and Russia.
Chinese Response
Beijing has rejected characterizations of its strategic buildup as destabilizing and has urged Washington to focus on nuclear disarmament responsibilities. A Chinese foreign ministry spokesman said the United States should lead by reducing its much larger nuclear arsenal to create conditions for broader disarmament.
Chinese official statements called repeated Pentagon reports attempts to justify U.S. nuclear modernization and mischaracterize China’s defense posture. Beijing maintains it adheres to a no-first-use nuclear policy and that its nuclear strategy remains defensive and minimal for national security needs.
Strategic and Policy Implications
The likely deployment of more than 100 ICBMs in fixed silos significantly alters the strategic calculus for regional and global deterrence. Fixed silos are inherently more vulnerable than mobile launchers, but they also signal confidence in force survivability and investment in hardened infrastructure. Expanded silo fields coupled with a larger fleet of land- and sea-based deterrents could complicate U.S. and allied planning.
For Washington, the assessment reinforces concerns that long-standing arms control mechanisms are eroding and that China may pursue an arsenal size and structure that challenges existing strategic frameworks. With the New START treaty set to lapse in early 2026, there is no comprehensive mechanism binding the United States, Russia, and China under shared verification standards. Experts warn that the absence of multilateral arms control agreements could fuel competitive nuclear build-ups.
The expansion also intersects with broader geopolitical tensions over Taiwan. Separate sections of the Pentagon assessment reportedly note Beijing’s military planning includes options for using overwhelming force to seize the island by 2027, potentially integrating strategic nuclear posture with conventional A2/AD (anti-access/area denial) operations in the Asia-Pacific.
Regional Security Dynamics
China’s nuclear developments will likely prompt policy responses from U.S. treaty allies in the Pacific, including Japan and South Korea, which have growing concerns about extended deterrence commitments. Japan hasalready debated limited nuclear sharing models and deeper integrated missile defense cooperation with the United States. South Korea’s security posture continues to evolve amid its own missile development and bilateral defense ties.
Russia’s role adds complexity. Moscow has repeatedly voiced opposition to U.S. missile defenses in Europe and Asia, framing them as destabilizing. A strategic triangle between the United States, Russia, and China, absent robust arms control dialogue, could see renewed investments in strategic delivery systems, including ICBMs and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs).
Closing Summary
The draft Pentagon report suggesting China has loaded more than 100 ICBMs in new silo fields marks a notable phase in Beijing’s strategic nuclear modernization. The development highlights the challenges facing global arms control at a moment when existing treaties wane and great power competition intensifies. Diplomatic engagement remains limited, even as the United States explores broader nuclear risk reduction dialogues. Observers will watch how both sides balance expansion with deterrence stability and whether new frameworks can emerge to manage nuclear risks in the coming decade.
