Kongsberg PROTECTOR

Kongsberg Adds Echodyne Radar to PROTECTOR Counter-UAS Systems

Kongsberg is integrating Echodyne MESA radar with its PROTECTOR RS4 and RS6 remote weapon stations, adding radar-supported detection, tracking and targeting functions to a weapon-system family increasingly being adapted for counter-unmanned aircraft system missions. Echodyne announced the selection on September 9, 2026, describing the integration as one of the first applications of its MESA radar platform with Kongsberg’s remote weapon systems.

The companies are presenting the capability at MSPO 2026 in Kielce, Poland, where the integration demonstrates an approach aimed at connecting compact radar sensing directly with an existing remote weapon station rather than requiring a separate dedicated air-defense vehicle for every firing position.

The development is significant because counter-UAS systems increasingly have to detect and track small aerial targets before an operator can employ a suitable effector. Adding radar to an established remote weapon station addresses that sensor-to-effector gap while retaining the weapon station’s existing electro-optical and fire-control architecture.

How the Echodyne MESA Integration Works

Echodyne’s MESA, or Metamaterials Electronically Scanned Array, is a compact solid-state radar architecture that electronically steers its beam rather than relying on a mechanically rotating antenna.

For the PROTECTOR integration, the radar supplies measurements including target range, bearing and radial velocity. Those data can be used by Kongsberg’s Collaborative Fire Control architecture to generate and maintain a track and to cue the weapon station’s electro-optical sensors.

The result is a more complete engagement sequence:

This architecture also allows the PROTECTOR system to receive tracks from external surveillance sensors. That matters in a networked air-defense environment because a weapon station does not necessarily have to discover every target independently.

Instead, a wider surveillance network can provide an initial track, while the local radar and electro-optical system refine the information before an engagement.

RS4 and RS6 Provide Different Counter-Drone Options

The integration covers two different PROTECTOR configurations.

Kongsberg describes the PROTECTOR RS4 as a flexible remote weapon station capable of carrying 5.56 mm, 7.62 mm and 12.7 mm machine guns, as well as 40 mm automatic grenade launchers. The system can also accommodate additional weapon and sensor configurations.

The RS4 is therefore suited to platforms where weight, size and existing armament remain important constraints. Kongsberg also states that the RS4 can support counter-UAS missions when combined with its Counter-UAS software.

The PROTECTOR RS6 provides a heavier weapons option. Its configuration can integrate the XM914 30 x 113 mm cannon, a coaxial 7.62 mm M240 machine gun and selected missiles. Kongsberg says the RS6 can combine radar sensors, Collaborative Fire Control and programmable airburst ammunition for engagements against small and medium-sized drones.

The U.S. Army separately identifies the XM914 as a 30 x 113 mm automatic chain gun capable of firing at up to 200 rounds per minute. The Army has also used the XM914 in counter-UAS development, including integration with the Mobile Low, Slow, Small Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Integrated Defeat System, or M-LIDS.

That gives the Kongsberg configuration a direct connection to a broader U.S. Army effort to adapt medium-caliber automatic weapons for the small-drone threat.

Why Radar Matters Against Small Drones

A remote weapon station already has an electro-optical sensor, but optical systems face limitations when attempting to maintain continuous tracks on small targets.

Small drones can present limited visual signatures, operate at low altitude and move against backgrounds containing terrain, buildings and other objects. Radar can provide continuous measurements of position and motion that are useful to the fire-control system even when the target is difficult to keep visually centered.

That distinction becomes particularly important during the final stages of an engagement.

A fire-control system needs more than a general indication that a drone is somewhere in the vicinity. It needs sufficiently accurate information about the target’s position and movement to point the weapon and calculate an engagement solution.

This is where the MESA integration has its main technical value. The radar provides measurements that can be used to maintain the track, while the electro-optical system can support visual confirmation and the weapon station can provide the final engagement.

Airburst Ammunition Changes the Engagement Problem

For small maneuvering drones, hitting the aircraft directly with a projectile can be difficult.

Programmable airburst ammunition changes that requirement by allowing the projectile to detonate near the target rather than depending entirely on a direct impact. When combined with accurate radar-derived range and velocity information, the fire-control system can place the burst around the predicted target position.

The U.S. Army is already pursuing related approaches. Its Armaments Center reported in June 2026 that it had demonstrated advanced counter-drone fire control using a Common Remotely Operated Weapon Station, enabling engagement of moving drones while the host vehicle was itself moving. The project uses sensor inputs and automated fire-control calculations to improve weapon pointing against aerial targets.

The parallel development is important because it shows that the challenge is not simply mounting a cannon on a remote turret. The central problem is creating an accurate and sufficiently automated detect, track, calculate and engage sequence.

From Remote Weapon Station to Distributed Air Defense

The larger significance of the Kongsberg and Echodyne integration is its potential to increase the number of available counter-UAS firing points.

A conventional short-range air-defense architecture may use dedicated vehicles carrying specialized radars, launchers or guns. Such systems remain important, but they can be expensive and limited in number.

A remote weapon station already mounted on a tactical vehicle represents a different starting point. Adding radar and appropriate software can potentially turn that platform into an additional counter-UAS node.

Kongsberg says the PROTECTOR family has more than 25,000 systems delivered and is in service across more than 31 nations.

That installed base is strategically relevant. If existing weapon stations can receive new sensors and software without requiring complete replacement, militaries may be able to increase counter-UAS density through upgrades rather than building an entirely separate fleet.

This does not make every PROTECTOR station a replacement for a dedicated air-defense system. Radar coverage, target classification, ammunition capacity, elevation limits, electronic warfare conditions and the number of simultaneous targets remain important constraints.

Instead, the concept adds another layer to a broader integrated air-defense network.

The NATO Context

The development arrives as NATO expands investment in counter-drone technology.

At the July 2026 NATO Summit Defence Industry Forum in Ankara, Allied nations announced plans to invest more than $40 billion in counter-drone capabilities over five years under the NATO Drone Edge initiative. NATO said the effort would support capabilities needed to rapidly detect, identify and neutralize drones.

The emphasis reflects operational lessons from Ukraine, the Middle East and repeated drone incidents affecting Allied territory.

The central requirement is increasingly one of scale. Militaries need enough sensors, command-and-control capacity and effectors to respond to large numbers of relatively inexpensive unmanned aircraft without consuming high-value interceptors against every low-cost target.

A distributed network of radar-equipped remote weapon stations could contribute to that objective by placing additional sensing and engagement capability closer to the units and assets that need protection.

Implications for U.S. and Allied Forces

For U.S. forces and other NATO militaries, the Kongsberg-Echodyne approach illustrates an important direction in counter-UAS modernization: upgrading existing combat platforms instead of relying exclusively on new dedicated systems.

The approach also fits the growing use of modular software and sensor architectures. The U.S. Army’s recent CROWS counter-UAS work similarly focuses on integrating fire-control software and sensor inputs with existing remote weapon station hardware.

There are practical advantages to this model. Existing vehicles already have mobility, communications, power generation, crew protection and logistics support. If the counter-UAS package can be integrated without imposing excessive size, weight and power requirements, the resulting capability can potentially be distributed across more units.

The principal challenge is achieving reliable performance in complex electromagnetic and physical environments. Small drones can be difficult radar targets, and terrain, buildings, weather, other aircraft and friendly systems can complicate tracking.

The system also has to manage the transition from detection to engagement quickly enough to defeat a maneuvering target. That requires close coordination between radar, fire control, electro-optics, weapon pointing and ammunition functionality.

A Broader Shift in Counter-UAS Design

The Kongsberg and Echodyne integration therefore represents more than the addition of another radar to a remote turret.

It reflects the movement toward distributed counter-UAS architectures, in which sensors and effectors can be placed across multiple vehicles and fixed positions and connected through a common fire-control network.

For Kongsberg, the integration gives the PROTECTOR family an additional route into the rapidly expanding counter-drone market. For Echodyne, integration with an established remote weapon system provides a path for its compact radar technology into a larger installed base of military platforms.

The immediate result is a PROTECTOR station with greater radar-supported sensing and targeting capability against drones. The broader military significance lies in the possibility of making existing tactical platforms part of a larger, layered air-defense network.

As NATO and individual Allied militaries increase counter-UAS spending, such upgrade-based approaches are likely to remain important alongside dedicated air-defense systems, electronic warfare, directed-energy weapons and interceptor-based solutions.

The objective is not a single universal counter-drone weapon. It is a sufficiently dense and connected defensive network capable of detecting, tracking and defeating aerial threats at the tactical level.

Technical Summary

Conclusion

Kongsberg’s integration of Echodyne MESA radar with the PROTECTOR RS4 and RS6 adds a radar-based sensing layer to a widely deployed family of remote weapon stations.

The technical importance lies in connecting radar measurements with electro-optical sensors, automated fire control and kinetic effectors. The strategic importance is the potential to turn more existing tactical platforms into distributed counter-UAS nodes.

As drone threats continue to expand in scale and complexity, the ability to field more affordable detection and engagement points will become an increasingly important part of NATO and U.S. force protection.

The Kongsberg-Echodyne configuration does not replace dedicated air-defense networks. Instead, it demonstrates how remote weapon stations already deployed on military platforms can be adapted to contribute to the layered counter-drone architecture now being developed across NATO.